Ex-FBI
Employee’s Case Raises New Security Concerns – washingtonpost.com

Ex-FBI Employee’s Case Raises New Security Concerns

Sham Marriage Led to U.S. Citizenship

By
Joby
Warrick and Dan Eggen

Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, November 14, 2007; Page A03

A Lebanese national who fraudulently gained U.S. citizenship through a
sham marriage managed to obtain sensitive jobs at both the
FBI
and
CIA,
and at one point used her security clearance to access restricted files
about the terrorist group
Hezbollah,
according to court documents filed yesterday.

U.S. officials say there is no evidence that Nada Nadim Prouty, 37, passed
secrets to Hezbollah or to other groups the United States considers
terrorist. But Prouty’s ability to conceal her past from two of the
nation’s top anti-terrorism agencies raised new concerns about their
vulnerability to infiltration.

Nada Nadim Prouty of Vienna pleaded guilty to charges including naturalization fraud and conspiracy. (By David Guralnick – Detroit News Via Associated Press)

“It is hard to imagine a greater threat than the situation where a
foreign national uses fraud to attain citizenship and then, based on
that fraud, insinuates herself into a sensitive position in the U.S.
government,” said U.S. Attorney Stephen J. Murphy in a statement
announcing a plea agreement with Prouty.

Prouty lives in
Vienna
and has worked for the CIA since 2003. She pleaded guilty in federal
court in
Detroit
to charges of conspiracy, naturalization fraud and unauthorized computer
access. In addition to losing her CIA job, she has agreed to forfeit her
U.S. citizenship and to face additional penalties, possibly including
fines and a prison term.

Prouty came to the United States as a college student and paid an
unemployed acquaintance to enter into a false marriage in 1990 so she
could gain U.S. citizenship, according to court documents. She got a job
as an FBI special agent in 1999, gaining a security clearance and a post
with the bureau’s Washington Field Office investigating overseas crimes.

In 2000, she accessed restricted FBI computer files on Hezbollah,
according to court documents, apparently to see whether family members
had been linked to the
Lebanon-based
group. Prouty also improperly took home unspecified classified
documents, according to her plea agreement. Justice officials said there
is no indication that the classified records were shared with others.

In June 2003, she left the FBI to join the CIA’s operations division,
accepting what was described as a mid-level position that would have
included multiple security clearances and the ability to work
undercover.

FBI spokesman Stephen Kodak said Prouty underwent a full background
investigation before she was hired, including interviews with her
current and former husband and with family and friends in Lebanon.
Prouty also passed an FBI polygraph test with “no deception noted,”
Kodak
said.

“These are some of the challenges that we have to realistically face
when we’re out there trying to hire so many people, especially those who
have foreign-language backgrounds or who weren’t born in this country,”
Kodak said. He said that no one else has been charged in the case but
that “the investigation is ongoing.”

Prouty’s sister and brother-in-law at one time attended a fundraiser in
Lebanon featuring a speech by Sheik Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whom the
U.S. government identifies as a terrorist and as an ideological leader
of Hezbollah. But a U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity because details of the probe remain classified, said that “at
this point, there is no reason to treat this as a counterterrorism case”
involving a hostile group.

The case marks yet another serious security breach at the FBI, which has
come under repeated criticism for lackluster security procedures after
the 2001 arrest of Robert P. Hanssen, a longtime Soviet and Russian spy.
In an October report, the
Justice
Department‘s inspector general concluded that the FBI is still
vulnerable to espionage because it has not implemented several key
security measures after that case, including improvements to its
background check system.

The report said that lapses in the FBI’s internal security program
prevented its officials from detecting breaches by Leandro Aragoncillo,
a former FBI intelligence analyst who provided national defense
documents to former and current Philippine officials. He was arrested in
2005 and in July was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Prouty’s case is also notable because of her ability to gain improper
access to files in the Automated Case System, the FBI’s antiquated
computer network. The FBI has bungled repeated attempts to replace ACS
and is unlikely to have a new system in place for several years.

Этого как бы и следовало ожидать. Как всегда дура-арабеска подумала, что ей позволено абсолютно всё и она у Аллаха за пазухой. Нет чтобы сидеть тихо, быть отличницой боевой и политической подготовки и спокойно ждать, блять, госпенсии и почёта. Для тех кому лень читать всю статью, перескажу по-быстрому. Девка из Ливана приезжает когда-то по студенческой визе в Штаты, даёт на лапу безработному соседу который на ней фиктивно женится. Она получает вид на жительство, гражданство и все права и привелегии сопутствующие этому. Спустя некоторое время она поступает на работу в ФБР, с блеском проходит детектор лжи, проверки и дознания. Потом переходит на работу в ЦРУ с повышением допуска к секретным материалам и возможностью подпольной работы. И тут, бля, шайтан её дёрнул пробить своих ливанских родственников на связи с Хезболой по секретным файлам ЦРУ. Тут же завыли сирены, зазвонили колокола, подсеклись растяжки и люди в чёрном вошли в распахнутые двери. Итог плачевен, лишат теперь всего, вплоть до гражданства. Кто был, бля, всем тому теперь обратно, нах, в кишлак.

С другой стороны я помню когда я им в ФБР задавал вопрос. Вы, бля, хотите, чтобы я явился в Квантико через 2 недели, а как же клиренс (допуск), полиграф, проверки и т.д.??? Там сказали прямо. Сегодня проходишь медосмотр, завтра полиграф, через неделю-две дают клиренс. Теоретически, я не удивлюсь, если какая-то организованная разведка (наша например) ведёт досье на всех аппликантов в эти органы. Проще задачи придумать невозможно. Все групповые собеседования и физические тесты проходят в одних и тех же отелях и на одних и тех же школьных стадионах вблизи региональных офисов. И всё это происходит обычно поздней весной перед летним “курсом молодого спецагента”. Подрядил дюжину человек-папараци в разных концах страны и за несколько лет можно собрать фотки всех будущих “разведчиков”.